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I. DETERMINATION OF GUILT
For practical purposes, Florida applies the death penalty only to first
degree murder cases. The State recognizes two forms of this offense:
unlawful killing from a premeditated design to kill,' and unlawful killing
during the attempt to commit, the commission of, or the flight from the
commission of an enumerated felony.2 Although the Florida Supreme
Court did nothing significant during the reporting period respecting felony
murders, it issued two interesting opinions regarding murder by premeditated
design. It also issued opinions regarding the State's failure to abide by plea
bargains in capital cases.
I. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)1 (1991).
2. Id. § 782.04(I)(a)2.
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A. The Element of Premeditated Design
In Hoefert v. State,3 the court found that the evidence did not support
a finding of a premeditated design to kill. The evidence showed that a
strangled woman was found in Robert Earl Hoefert's apartment, and the
State presented ample collateral crime evidence that he had also choked
other women while assaulting or raping them.' Thus, it appeared that he
had strangled the woman while committing a sexual assault on her.
Nevertheless, the supreme court found that the evidence did not support his
conviction for first degree murder, notwithstanding previous cases stating
that strangulation is sufficient to establish premeditation.' Hoefert is
especially interesting because the court left open the question of whether
Florida's standard jury instruction on premeditation correctly defines the
statutory element of premeditated design.
In contrast to Hoefert is Trepal v. State.6 George J. Trepal, in an
elaborate attempt to force a neighboring family to move away, put poison
in Coca-Cola bottles in the family's home, and as a result, one person died
and the others fell quite ill.7 With two justices dissenting, the supreme
court held the evidence supported a finding of a premeditated design to
kill.8 In his dissent, Justice McDonald argued that the evidence did not
show that Mr. Trepal intended to kill any of the family members, so that the
evidence supported only a finding of second degree murder.9
In another case involving the premeditation element, the court found
no error in excluding mental health expert testimony showing that the
defendant did not premeditate the murder.' °
B. Violation of Plea Agreements
In Hunt v. State," Deidre Hunt pleaded guilty to two first degree
murders once the State agreed her penalty proceeding would take place after
that of her co-defendant, Konstantino Fotopoulos. She thereafter indicated
her refusal to testify against Mr. Fotopoulos. Deeming this refusal a
3. 617 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1993).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1049.
6. 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1367.
9. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
10. Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993).
11. 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1992).
1993]
3
Caldwell: Capital Crimes
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
violation of the plea agreement, the State sought, and the trial court granted,
an order to reschedule her sentencing so that it would occur before the
Fotopoulos trial. Ms. Hunt was sentenced to death. On appeal, she argued
the plea should be set aside because the State had violated the plea
agreement. Determining that "the State's agreement that Hunt's sentencing
would be postponed until after Fotopoulos' trial was not contingent upon
Hunt's cooperation and testimony in that case,"' 2 the supreme court found
that the State had violated the plea agreement. 13 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that "specific performance is an adequate remedy," refused to
grant Ms. Hunt her requested relief and, instead, ordered new sentencing
proceedings.14
In Long v. State, 5 the supreme court found that the State had also
failed to abide with a plea agreement in its tangled dealings with Robert Joe
Long.' 6 In 1985, Mr. Long was found guilty of first degree murder and
other offenses in Pasco County. Later that year, he pleaded guilty to eight
murders and several other felonies in Hillsborough County after the State
agreed not to use those crimes against him in any subsequent penalty
proceeding. He was sentenced to death for one of the Hillsborough County
convictions, and to life imprisonment for the others. In separate appeals, his
Pasco County conviction and death sentence, and the Hillsborough death
sentence were vacated." On remand, Mr. Long was again found guilty of
the Pasco murder and sentenced to death. In a separate proceeding he was
sentenced to death for the Hillsborough murders. In the Pasco County
sentencing proceedings, the State used evidence of the Hillsborough County
offenses. On appeal, the supreme court again reversed the Pasco conviction
for various reasons, and ruled that use of the Hillsborough offenses violated
the Hillsborough plea agreement. 18 In the new Hillsborough appeal,
however, the supreme court refused to set aside the plea agreement. It
reasoned that since it had set aside the Pasco sentence and ruled that the
State could not use the plea agreement in any subsequent penalty proceed-
ings, the matter was moot: Mr. Long had in effect received specific performance. 9
12. Id. at 897.
13. Id. at 898.
14. Id.
15. 529 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988).
16. Id. at 292.
17. Long v. State, 529 So. 2d 286 (Fla.) (Pasco County case), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1017 (1988); Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1987) (Hillsborough County case).
18. Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 1992).
19. Id.
Vol. 18
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C. Evidence: Gruesome Photographs
Murder trials typically involve the State's use of gruesome photographs
of the decedent. In the past, the supreme court has deferred to the trial
court's discretion regarding the admissibility of such photographs, but
during the survey period, it strongly cautioned that their use may lead to
reversal of a conviction.2°
II. PENALTY PROCEEDINGS
A. Aggravating Circumstances
1. Sentence of Imprisonnent
2
'
There were no developments regarding this circumstance during the
survey period.
2. Previous Violent Felony Conviction
22
There were several recent developments regarding the "previous violent
felony conviction" circumstance.
a. Evidence
In the past, the supreme court has ruled the State may introduce
extensive evidence detailing the facts of a defendant's prior violent offens-
es. However, in two cases during the survey period, the court found
error when the State used photographs depicting the victims of the prior
violent felonies during the penalty phase of the case.24
20. See Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 804 (Fla. 1992); Elledge v. State, 613 So.
2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1993).
21. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(a) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control.").
22. See id. § 921.141 (5)(b) ("The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.").
23. E.g., Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998
(Fla. 1977). But see Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990) (holding it was error to
permit spouse of victim, whom defendant had previously been convicted of killing, to testify
concerning victim's death at penalty phase of prosecution).
24. See Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993); Elledge, 613 So. 2d at 434.
5
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b. Weight
During the survey period, the court appears to have increased the
weight that is given to a prior violent felony when the prior violent felony
was a murder. In Duncan v. State, the court upheld a death sentence when
a prior violent felony was the only aggravating circumstance to support
Donn A. Duncan's death sentence for the murder of his fiancee.25 Mr.
Duncan had previously been convicted of a second degree murder commit-
ted in prison, and had a contemporaneous (and hence "previous")26 convic-
tion for a second degree murder of a fellow prison inmate twenty-one years
before.
In Slawson v. State,27 the court upheld three death sentences where the
only aggravating circumstance was that the defendant had "previous" violent
felony convictions for contemporaneous murders on various members of the
victim's family.28 The supreme court supported the trial court's reasoning
that the murder of two helpless children gave added weight to the circum-
stance.29
3. Great Risk"
The court upheld application of the "great risk" circumstance to the
curious facts in Trepal v. State." During a dispute with the neighboring
Carr family, George Trepal decided to put poison into bottles of Coca-Cola
in the Carrs' home. Peggy Carr died and two others were hospitalized. A
jury found Mr. Trepal guilty of first degree murder, six counts of attempted
first degree murder, seven counts of poisoning food or water, and one count
of tampering with a consumer product. The supreme court wrote of the trial
court's use of the "great risk" circumstance:
Trepal raises ... that it was error to find the aggravating circumstance
"great risk of death to persons." He argues that only a possible risk, a
mere speculation, existed and even the full bottles of cola were not
25. Duncan, 619 So. 2d at 279.
26. E.g., Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979). See generally Craig S. Barnard,
Death Penalty, 13 NOVA L. REV. 907, 912-16 (1989).
27. 619 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1993).
28. Id. at 260. The court also sustained the death sentence for the murder of another
family member where the trial court also applied the heinousness circumstance. Id. at 261.
29. Id. at 259.
30. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c) (1991) ("The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to many persons.").
31. 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993).
Vol. 18
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proven to contain a deadly dose of poison, so great risk of death was
not proven. He argues that only four persons resided in the Carr home,
the other three lived in the detached apartment; therefore, this is not
many persons. He also argues that as the number of persons who
consumed the cola increased the risk of death decreased because the
more people among whom it was divided the less the likelihood that a
sufficiently large quantity of poison would be consumed. We reject
these arguments. The evidence showed that seven family members
lived on the Carr property at all times, other family members visited
regularly, and Trepal knew that "there were a lot of people coming and
going" on the Carr property. The contents of the full cola bottles
contained lethal doses of thallium. The contents of the empty cola
bottles killed and seriously injured members of the Carr household.
Great risk of harm to many persons has been shown.
Trepal next argues that the "great risk" aggravating circumstance
was improperly doubled with the "prior violent felony" aggravating
circumstance. Prior violent felony may involve great risk of harm to
many persons but need not necessarily do so. Each of these circum-
stances deals with a different aspect of the crime; therefore, each is
proper.32
4. Felony Murder33
Application of the felony murder circumstance is usually straightfor-
ward; either the murder occurred during an enumerated felony or it did not.
In one case, however, the court struck the circumstance. In Clark v.
State,34 Ronald Clark shot a man with the apparent motive of obtaining the
man's job. After shooting him, he took his money and boots. The supreme
court disapproved use of the felony murder circumstance, reasoning that the
theft of the money and boots was an afterthought.35
32. Id. al 1367 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed while
the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery,
arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb.").
34. 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992).
35. Id.
1993]
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5. The Law Enforcement Circumstances: Avoiding
Arrest, Hindering Law Enforcement, and
Murder of Law Enforcement Officer
36
Of the three law enforcement circumstances, courts most frequently
apply the one involving avoiding arrest; the other two generally merge with
that circumstance. The court set forth the law which governs the aggravat-
ing circumstance of avoiding arrest in Robertson v. State:
37
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating
circumstance exists. Moreover, even the trial court may not draw
"logical inferences" to support a finding of a particular aggravating
circumstance when the State has not met its burden. In order to support
a finding that a defendant committed a murder to avoid arrest, the State
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's dominant or
only motive for the murder of the victim, who is not a law enforcement
officer, is the elimination of a witness. "Proof of the requisite intent to
avoid arrest and detection must be very strong" to support this aggravat-
ing circumstance when the victim is not a law enforcement officer.38
Thus, in the fairly typical case of Davis v. State,39 the court disapproved
use of the circumstance where Henry Davis killed an elderly woman whose
home he was burglarizing. 40 The trial court had found the circumstance
because the woman knew Mr. Davis and could identify him as the burglar.
The supreme court held that the fact that witness elimination may have been
a motive in the murder was insufficient to support the circumstance.41
Although Davis represents the usual approach to the circumstance, the
supreme court will sometimes uphold the circumstance even where there is
no clear evidence of motive. In Hall v. State,42 the court upheld the
36. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(e) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody."); Id.
§ 921.141(5)(g) ("The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws."); Id. § 921.141(5)0) ("The victim
of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official
duties.").
37. 611 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1993) (striking circumstance where defendant murdered
woman who had witnessed her companion's murder).
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. 604 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1992).
40. Id. at 795.
41. Id. at 798; see also Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1993) (murder of store
clerk during robbery).
42. 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993).
Vol. 1 8
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circumstance when Freddie Lee Hall and another man kidnapped, raped and
murdered a woman, leaving her body in the woods. Citing to many prior
cases which applied the circumstance "when the victim is transported to
another location and then killed, 43 the supreme court determined "the
evidence leaves no reasonable inference except that Hall and Ruffin killed
the victim to eliminate the only witness to their having kidnapped and raped
her and having stolen her car." 4 4 One may wonder how this is not the sort
of "logical inference" forbidden by Robertson v. State.45
In Fotopoulos v. State,46 the supreme court also approved application
of the circumstance to Deidre Hunt's co-defendant, Konstantinos Fotopo-
ulos, as there was evidence that Fotopoulos killed a man who knew of his
illegal activities and planned to blackmail him.47 The court rejected the
defense's argument that witness elimination was but one of several motives
for the murder.48
6. Pecuniary Gain
49
Except when the murder occurs to obtain insurance proceeds,5" this
circumstance is usually merged with the felony murder circumstance."
Fotopoulos presented a somewhat different merger issue. The evidence was
that Mr. Fotopoulos committed two murders as part of a fantastic plan to
obtain insurance proceeds in his wife's murder. 2 The supreme court
rejected the defense's argument that it was error to give separate consider-
ation to the pecuniary gain and premeditation circumstances because they in-
volved the same aspects of the crime."
43. Id. at 477.
44. Id. at 477-78.
45. 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1992).
46. 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1992).
47. Id. at 792.
48. Id. Another strong motive behind the blackmailer's murder was to ensnare Ms. Hunt
into a plot to kill Mr. Fotopoulos's wife. Id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain.").
50. E.g., Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 784.
51. E.g., Davis, 604 So. 2d at 794.
52. Having had Ms. Hunt participate in the videotaped murder of a man who had been
blackmailing him, Mr. Fotopoulos used the tape to blackmail her into participating in a
scheme in which they would murder another man hired to murder Mrs. Fotopoulos, after
which they would gain insurance proceeds in the wife's death. The plan went awry when
the second man shot, but failed to kill the wife. Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 784, 786.
53. Id. at 790.
1993]
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7. Heinousness54
The supreme court has held in the past that this circumstance does not
apply vicariously when the defendant ordered the murder but did not
command that it involve torture," and does not apply when the murder is
by gunshot. 6 During the survey period, the court struck the circumstance
in several cases in conformance with these precedents. 7 While cases
striking vicarious application are straightforward, gunshot cases turn on fine
distinctions. In Clark, the court rejected the State's argument that the
murder was heinous because the defendant reloaded his gun between the
first shot and the fatal shot so as to make the decedent aware of an
impending death:
The State argues that . . . because Carter was probably conscious
between the time the first shot was fired and the time he was killed by
the second shot, and therefore was probably aware of his impending
death. However, the evidence indicates that the fatal shot came almost
immediately after the initial shot to the chest. The fact that it took
more than one shot to kill this victim does not set this crime apart from
the norm of capital felonies, and there is no indication that the crime
was committed in such a manner as to cause unnecessary and prolonged
suffering to the victim. We therefore agree with Clark that this
aggravating circumstance is not present in this case.58
The Clark court cited Brown v. State59 and Lewis v. State6" in support of
its decision. In Brown, the court ruled the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravator was not warranted when the victim had been shot in the arm,
begged for his life, and then was shot in the head.6" Similarly, the Lewis
court held the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravator was improperly found
54. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1991) ("The capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.").
55. Omelus v. State, 584 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1991).
56. E.g., McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991).
57. Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993) (vicarious application); Archer v.
State, 613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993); see also Cannady v. State, 620 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1993)
(murder by gunshot); Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1993); Robertson v. State,
611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1992); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992).
58. Clark, 609 So. 2d at 514-15 (citing Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988); Lewis v. State, 377 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1979)).
59. 526 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1988).
60. 377 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1979).
61. Brown, 526 So. 2d at 907.
Vol. 18
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when the victim was shot in the chest, attempted to flee, and then was shot
in the back.62
One might have trouble squaring the supreme court's decisions in
Brown v. State63 and Lewis v. State64 with the court's decision in Rodri-
guez v. State,65 where the court wrote:
Next, we reject Rodriguez's claim that this murder was the result of a
simple shooting and therefore cannot be considered heinous, atrocious,
or cruel under section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1989). After the
shooting, Rodriguez bragged that when Mr. Saladrigas would not turn
over his belongings, Rodriguez shot the man twice, first in the knee and
then in the stomach. As his victim ran, pleading for his life, Rodriguez
shot him again because Saladrigas still had not given up his watch.
After being wounded, Mr. Saladrigas ran over 200 feet with his attacker
in pursuit only to be shot a fourth time behind a car where he sought
cover. These facts set this murder apart from the norm of capital
felonies and support the conclusion that Rodriguez enjoyed or was
utterly indifferent to the suffering of his victim.66
Although they were decided in the same month, and were pending on
rehearing at the same time, Clark and Rodriguez make no mention of each
other. Similar to Rodriguez is Lucas v. State,67 in which the court upheld
application of the circumstance when, after repeatedly threatening her,
Harold Gene Lucas chased, beat, and repeatedly shot a 16-year-old girl.6"
The court continued to uphold the circumstance in almost all non-
gunshot murders.69  However, the supreme court recently rejected State
62. Lewis, 377 So. 2d at 646.
63. 526 So. 2d 903, 906-07 (Fla. 1988) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator
improperly fiund where victim was shot in the arm, begged for his life, then shot in the
head); see also Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1228 (defendant repeatedly shot woman as she cried
and screamed after he shot her companion); Bums v. State, 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992)
(striking circumstance where drug trafficker shot officer begging for his life while standing
in water-filled ditch).
64. 377 So. 2d 640, 646 (Fla. 1979) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator improperly
found where victim shot in the chest, attempted to flee, then shot in the back).
65. 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992).
66. Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
67. 613 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1992).
68. Id. at 411 n.5.
69. See Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 478-79 (Fla. 1993) (rape and beating); Happ v.
State, 618 So. 2d 205, 206-07 (Fla. 1993) (beating and anal rape); Slawson v. State, 619 So.
2d 255, 259-60 (Fla. 1993) (shooting and slicing pregnant woman, expelling fetus from
abdomen); Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291-93 (Fla. 1993) (strangulation); Davis v.
11
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argument that the trial court erred in not finding the circumstance in a
strangulation case, noting that it was not clear whether the victim was awake
when murdered.7"
Cases remanded by the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration in
view of Espinosa v. Florida7 are discussed below in the section on
appellate review.
8. Premeditation
72
The premeditation circumstance continues to be the one most prone to
misapplication. During the. survey period the supreme court struck the
circumstance in eight direct appeal cases,73 and affirmed it in ten. 74 As in
past years, it disapproved of the use of the circumstance in felony murder
cases when the evidence showed the felony, but not the murder, was
planned,75 or when the defendant was so upset that the murder was not
State, 604 So. 2d 794, 798 (Fla. 1992) (stabbing); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 464-65
(Fla. 1992) (beating, dragging, stabbing); Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429, 433-34 (Fla. 1992)
(burning); Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268, 1272-73 (Fla. 1992) (rape, choking, beating,
stabbing), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 104 (1993); Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 805 (Fla.
1992) (beating); Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856, 863-64 (Fla. 1992) (rape and stabbing of
12-year-old girl).
70. DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993).
71. 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i) (1991) ("The capital felony was a homicide and was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or
legal justification.").
73. See Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1993); Cannady v. State, 620 So. 2d 165
(Fla. 1993); Padilla v. State, 618 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1993); Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298
(Fla. 1993); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 214 (1993);
Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1993); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992);
Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1992).
74. Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993); Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.
1993); DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1993); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992); Jones v. State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 112 (1993); Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992);
Fotopolous v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1992); Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2366 (1993); Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1660 (1993).
These totals do not include cases on remand from the Supreme Court, or three cases
in which the trial court found the circumstance, and the supreme court reversed for other
reasons without holding whether the circumstance was properly found. See Scott v. State,
603 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1992); Hunt v. State, 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1992); Valentine v. State,
616 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1992).
75. Power, 605 So. 2d at 856.
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cold-blooded.76 In one case, the supreme court found it could not apply
the circumstance when the defendant was high on cocaine at the time of the
murder.77
The court reached differing results when the murders occurred after the
defendant had moved the decedent to a remote location. In Clark, the court
found error in applying the circumstance when Ronald Wayne Clark took
a man out to the woods and killed him with two blasts from a sawed-off
shotgun.78 Similarly, in Crump v. State, the court found error when
Michael Tyrone Crump bound, beat, and strangled a prostitute after driving
her to a park.7 9 In both cases, the court reasoned the state had not proven
an intent to kill when the decedents entered the killers' vehicles.8
Therefore, the circumstance did not apply. The court reached this decision
notwithstanding the fact there was evidence that Mr. Crump had murdered
another prostitute in very similar circumstances, which "showed that Crump
killed both [women] in a criminal pattern in which he picked up prostitutes,
bound them, strangled them, and discarded their nude bodies near cemeter-
ies.181
In Long v. State,8 2 the court took a less charitable view and upheld the
circumstance without discussion.83 The evidence showed that Mr. Long
bound and raped a prostitute and then, after deciding to return her to where
he had picked her up, he instead choked and beat her and cut her throat.
The supreme court also upheld the premeditation circumstance in Hall v.
State. 4 In Hall, the court addressed the sentencing of Freddie Lee Hall to
death in the abduction and brutal murder of a pregnant woman:
The evidence also supports finding the murder to have been committed
in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner with no pretense of
moral or legal justification. The record shows that Hall and Ruffin
intended to steal the victim's car. To that end, they could have taken
the car and simply left her in the parking lot. Instead, however, they
abducted, raped, beat, and finally killed her. Even if Hall did not fire
76. Cannady, 620 So. 2d at 169; Padilla, 618 So. 2d at 165; Maulden, 617 So. 2d at
298.
77. White, 616 So. 2d at 21.
78. Clark, 609 So. 2d at 514.
79. Crump, 622 So. 2d at 966.
80. Clark, 609 So. 2d at 515; Crump, 622 So. 2d at 972.
81. Crump, 622 So. 2d at 971.
82. 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992).
83. Id. at 1275.
84. 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993).
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the shot that killed the victim, he was a willing if not predominant
participant in the other acts. The totality of the circumstances show this
murder to have been committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner. There is no merit to Hall's argument that his mental retarda-
tion provided a pretense of moral or legal justification. Additionally it
is not improper to apply this aggravator to killings committed before the
legislature adopted it.85
In Trepal v. State, the court rejected a claimed "pretense of moral or
legal justification."86 In Trepal, the contention was that the murder was
committed to get rid of unwanted neighbors.87
B. Mitigation
1. Treatment of Co-Defendants
In Scott v. State,8" the evidence was that Jeremy Lynn Scott and
Bryan Hall murdered a man to conceal the theft of his car. Mr. Hall,
testifying for the state, claimed that the theft and murder were not his idea
and that he hit the man only once, whereas Mr. Scott hit and strangled him.
Accepting Mr. Hall's testimony at face value, the court wrote:
[w]e also note that Scott's accomplice, Bryan Hall, received a life
sentence for his participation in the murder. While the disparate
treatment of equally culpable accomplices can serve as a valid
basis for a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the
evidence presented at trial indicates that Hall and Scott were not
equally culpable.89
The court, however, did not explain why the jury could not reasonably
discount Mr. Hall's claim of lesser culpability.
The discussion in Williams v. State" was similar. Darrell Frazier,
Bruce Frazier, Timothy Robinson, and Michael Coleman participated in the
brutal murders of various persons suspected of crossing a drug trafficking
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993); see also Hall, 614 So. 2d at 473;
Jones, 612 So. 2d at 1370.
87. Trepal, 621 So. 2d at 1364.
88. 603 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1992).
89. Id. at 1277 n.4.
90. 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993).
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ring headed by Ronald Lee Williams.9' Testifying for the State, the
Fraziers contended that the murders were Williams' idea and that Coleman
and Robinson did the actual killing. Overriding a life verdict, the trial court
sentenced Mr. Williams to death. The Fraziers received life sentences for
their cooperation.92 The supreme court affirmed, saying that the disparate
treatment of the Fraziers was not a mitigating factor since (according to their
self-serving testimony) they were less culpable than Mr. Williams.93
In contrast, Scott v. State9" involved a defendant whose sentence was
reduced to life because of the disparate sentence of his co-defendant.
Abron Scott and Amos Earl Robinson kidnapped and murdered a man,
apparently to steal his car. On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed
Mr. Scott's death sentence, 95 but reversed Mr. Robinson's in part because
the trial court had refused to instruct the jury on the mitigating circumstance
of minor participation.96 The court wrote that Mr. Robinson's statements
to the police, minimizing his involvement, could reasonably support the
mitigating circumstance.97 The trial court subsequently sentenced Robinson
to life imprisonment. 98 As a result of Robinson's resentencing, Mr. Scott
moved for post-conviction relief, asserting his co-defendant's lesser sentence
could reasonably lead to a lesser sentence for himself.99 He had powerful
evidence for this claim: the original trial judge who had sentenced both
men to death had written to the Clemency Board that she considered both
equally culpable, and recusing herself, said that she thought they were
"equally deranged and equally had poor records."'' °  In view of the
judge's representations, the supreme court reduced Mr. Scott's sentence to
life imprisonment.' Thus, one defendant's sentence, reduced in part on a
claim of minimal participation, led to reduction of the other defendant's
sentence on a claim of equal participation.
91. Id. at 458.
92. Mr. Coleman and Mr. Robinson were also sentenced to death, and their sentences
affirmed by the supreme court. Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Coleman
v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 821 (1993).
93. Williams, 622 So. 2d at 464.
94. 494 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1986).
95. Id. at 1139.
96. Robinson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 1986).
97. Id. at 1043.
98. Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 468-69.
101. Id. at 470.
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2. Waiver of Mitigation
In Koon v. Dugger,10 2 the Florida Supreme Court established the
circumstances in which the trial court should allow defense counsel to waive
presentation of mitigation. The court stated:
When a defendant, against his counsel's advice, refuses to permit the
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must
inform the court on the record of the defendant's decision. Counsel
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably believes
there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and what that
evidence would be. The court should then require the defendant to
confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these matters with
him, and despite counsel's recommendation, he wishes to waive
presentation of penalty phase evidence." 3
C. Evidence and Argument
1. The Character of the Decedent
The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no Eighth Amendment bar
to evidence and argument about the decedent's character in capital sen-
tencing proceedings.10 4 The Florida Legislature has amended the Florida
Statutes to authorize the same."' The Florida Supreme Court's treatment
of such evidence and argument is somewhat confusing.
In Thomas v. State,10 6 the court considered the decedent's criminal
activity irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Similarly, in Marshall v.
State, '7 the court seemed to disapprove of "negative characterization of
the victim" as mitigation."'8 On the other hand, the court in Jones v.
102. 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993).
103. Id. at 250.
104. Payne v. Tennessee, Il1 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
105. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7) (Supp. 1992). At least one trial court judge has
declared this subsection unconstitutional. State v. Maxwell, No. 80-8767 (B) (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct. June 22, 1993).
106. 618 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1993) ("The victim's efforts to buy cocaine are irrelevant to
Thomas' culpability."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 321 (1993).
107. 604 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1992).
108. Id. at 806 ("Furthermore, defense counsel's argument composed largely of a
negative characterization of the victim does not provide a reasonable basis for the jury's life
recommendation.").
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State"9 approved of evidence and argument regarding the decedent's state
of mind at the time of the killing."'
In Burns v. State,"' seeking to rebut assertions in the defense
opening statement, the State introduced evidence of the decedent's
background and character as a law enforcement officer." 2  Pointing to
Payne v. Tennessee, the supreme court rejected the argument that such
evidence violated the Eighth Amendment." 3 Nevertheless, reasoning that
counsel's opening statement is not evidence and therefore does not open the
door to rebuttal evidence, the court found the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony." 4 While the improper evidence constituted harmless error
as to guilt, the court found its erroneous admission required a resenten-
cing." 5 One may find this result baffling: even if the evidence was not
admissible as to guilt, it was apparently admissible as to penalty; if it was
admissible as to penalty, then the character of the victim was a valid
sentencing consideration. Perhaps what really troubled the supreme court
was the extent of the prosecutor's argument.
2. Argument Generally
Although the supreme court is sometimes disposed to think that juries
are improperly swayed by arguments of defense counsel," 6 it will seldom
reverse a death sentence because of improper argument by the State. It
109. 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992).
110. Id. at 1374 (citing Payne, I I! S. Ct. at 2597).
111. 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992).
112. Id. at 603.
113. Id. at 605.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 606. The court stated:
Reverting to our earlier finding that it was error to admit the background
evidence of the deceased, we cannot with the same certainty determine it to be
harmless in the penalty phase. The testimony was extensive and it was
frequently referred to by the prosecutor. The prosecutor described the defendant
as an evil supplier of drugs and contrasted him with the deceased. These
emotional issues may have improperly influenced the jury in their recommenda-
tion.
Burns, 609 So. 2d at 607.
116. Eg., Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456, 464 (Fla. 1993); Marshall, 604 So. 2d at
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imposes a very high standard for reversal, and frequently finds claims of
improper argument defaulted." 7
Interesting questions regarding argument as evidence are presented by
Hunt v. State"' and Burns v. State." 9 Ms. Hunt contended that the
State's argument in her co-defendant's trial, that her co-defendant was the
leader and she was the follower, could be used as defensive evidence at her
resentencing. 2 ° The supreme court left the issue open.' 2 ' Burns estab-
lishes that counsel's opening statement is not evidence subject to rebuttal
testimony. 122
3. Hearsay
In Duncan v. State,'23 the court granted the State's cross appeal from
the trial court's finding of mitigation. Although the record contained Mr.
Duncan's statements to the police that he "went nuts" before the murder, the
supreme court found such evidence was hearsay and could not support a
mitigating circumstance.' 24 This conclusion is questionable since the State
used the statements as substantive evidence of guilt,'25 and the court has
elsewhere ruled that the defendant's unsupported statements to the police
can establish a mitigating circumstance,'26 and can negate an aggravating
circumstance. '27
117. See Stewart v. State, 620 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21
(Fla. 1993); Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500-01 (Fla. 1992) (defaulting issue for
failure to seek curative instruction even though defense objected and moved for mistrial);
Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992).
118. 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1992).
119. Burns, 609 So. 2d at 600.
120. Hunt, 613 So. 2d at 898.
121. Id. at 898 n.5. The court stated: "[W]e do not reach the merits of Hunt's conten-
tion, which was made in a notice of supplemental authority to her motion for judicial notice,
that the State's portrayal of Hunt as a victim in the Fotopoulos trial must be treated as
'judicial admissions by a party opponent:.' Id. (citations omitted).
122. Burns, 609 So. 2d at 605.
123. 618 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993).
124. Id. at 281.
125. Id. at 284.
126. See e.g., Robinson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1040, 1042-43 (Fla. 1986) (defendant's
statements to police could establish circumstance of minor participation).
127. See Banda v. State, 536 So. 2d 221, 224-25 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1087 (1989); Cannady v. State, 427 So. 2d 723, 730-31 (Fla. 1983).
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The court has continued to permit the State to present hearsay evidence
of the defendant's prior violent felonies. 2 ' In Thompson v. State,'29 a
resentencing case, the court found no error in the State's use of an unavail-
able witness's testimony at the first sentencing, despite defense argument
that the defense cross-examination at the earlier sentencing was mini-
mal. 1
30
4. Mental Health Evidence
In Burns, the trial court had denied a State motion to have its mental
health expert examine Mr. Bums in anticipation of the defendant offering
mental health as mitigating circumstance.' 3 ' Instead, the trial court permit-
ted the State's expert to be present during the penalty phase in preparation
for his testimony, notwithstanding the rule of sequestration of witnesses.,
32
The supreme court approved the decision waiving the rule of sequestration,
but left open the question whether the state could have its expert examine
the defendant.1 3 3 The court stated:
We do not pass on whether the court erred in denying the state's request
to have its expert examine Burns. However, because there is no rule of
criminal procedure that specifically authorizes a state's expert to
examine a defendant facing the death penalty when the defendant
intends to establish either statutory or nonstatutory mental mitigating
factors during the penalty phase of the trial, the matter has been brought
to the attention of the Florida Criminal Rules Committee for consider-
ation. 34
In Long v. State,'3 the court found no error in the State's penalty
phase use of a mental health expert who had examined Mr. Long regarding
his sanity at the time of the offense as the defendant had filed a notice of
intent to rely on a defense of insanity. 36
128. See Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268, 1274-75 (Fla. 1992).
129. 619 So. 2d 261 (Fla.), cert. denied, _ S. Ct. __ (1993).
130. Id.
131. Burns, 609 So. 2d at 603.
132. Id. at 606 n.8.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992).
136. Id. at 1275.
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In Johnson v. State,137 the court upheld the trial court's ruling that the
State could cross-examine a defense expert about Paul Johnson's prior drug
offenses even though Mr. Johnson had waived the mitigating circumstance
of lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity. 3
D. Jury instructions
The supreme court usually rejects jury instruction issues on grounds of
procedural default. In two cases, however, it indicated that it considers the
1991 jury instruction' 39 regarding the heinous aggravating circumstance
constitutionally adequate. 4 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court Committee
on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has proposed to submit an
amended instruction to the supreme court.'4
E. The Judge's Sentencing Order
The survey period contains several cases setting out the trial court's
duties in preparing its sentencing order.
137. 608 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1992).
138. Id. at 14.
139. The jury instruction provides:
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to
inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the
suffering of others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous,
atrocious, or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the
crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.
In re Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases-No. 90-1, 579 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1991).
140. Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993); Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856 (Fla.
1992).
141. Comment sought on "heinous, atrocious or cruel, " THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Feb.
15, 1993, p.2 . The committee proposed the following instruction:
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel. To commit a crime that is heinous, atrocious or cruel, the
defendant must have deliberately inflicted or consciously chosen a method of
death with the intent to cause extraordinary mental anguish or physical pain to
the victim, and the victim must have consciously suffered such mental anguish
or physical pain for a substantial period of time before death.
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1. Timeliness
The trial court must enter its written sentencing order, setting out its
written evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, at the time
of imposition of sentence. 142 Accordingly, the supreme court reduced a
death sentence to life imprisonment where a trial court judge did not render
its sentencing order, and in fact did not give any oral grounds for the
sentence, until twelve days after imposition of the sentence.
In Spencer v. State, 44 the same judge erred in the opposite direction.
The judge met ex parte with the prosecutor to draft the order sentencing
Leonard Spencer to death before Mr. Spencer's attorney had an opportunity
to argue for his client's life:
Next, we find it important to address the ex parte communications
between the trial judge and the state attorney. In Grossman, we
directed that written orders imposing the death sentence be prepared
prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence. However, we did not
perceive that our decision would be used in such a way that the trial
judge would formulate his decision prior to giving the defendant an
opportunity to be heard. We contemplated that the following sentencing
procedure be used in sentencing phase proceedings. First, the trial
judge should hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and
the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the
State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence;
c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any
presentence or medical report; and d) afford the defendant an opportuni-
ty to be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argu-
ment, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the
appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence
should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida
Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for
imposing the death sentence. Third, the trial judge should set a hearing
to impose the sentence and contemporaneously file the sentencing order.
Such a process was clearly not followed during these proceedings.
It is the circuit judge who has the principal responsibility for
determining whether a death sentence should be imposed. Capital
proceedings are sensitive and emotional proceedings in which the trial
judge plays an extremely critical role. This Court has stated that there
142. Stewart v. State, 549 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990);
Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
143. Hemandez v. State, 621 So. 2d 1353, 1356-57 (Fla. 1993).
144. 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
19931
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is nothing "more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the
judiciary than a one-sided communication between a judge and a single
litigant." This statement was made in recognition of the purpose of
canon 3A(4), Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally inter-
ested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard
according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither
initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications con-
cerning a pending or impending proceeding. 45
On the other hand, the court in Lucas v. State46 approved Harold
Gene Lucas' death sentence when the trial court prepared the sentencing
order before the sentencing hearing, but only after considering a defense
sentencing memorandum filed two months before.' 47
2. Treatment of Mitigation
The Supreme Court of Florida continues its inconsistency regarding
discussion of mitigation in sentencing orders. At one extreme is Farr v.
State, 41 in which the court reversed because the trial court failed to
consider mitigation that was apparent on the record even though Victor
Marcus Farr plead guilty, waived mitigation, and demanded that he be
sentenced to death.' 49 The court stated:
Farr argues that the trial court was required to consider any evidence of
mitigation in the record, including the psychiatric evaluation and
presentence investigation. Our law is plain that such a requirement in
fact exists. We repeatedly have stated that mitigating evidence must be
considered and weighed when contained anywhere in the record, to the
extent it is believable and uncontroverted. That requirement applies
with no less force when a defendant argues in favor of the death
penalty, and even if the defendant asks the court not to consider
mitigating evidence."'
145. Id. at 691.
146. 613 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1992).
147. Id.
148. 621 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1993).
149. Id. at 1382.
150. Id. (emphasis added); see also Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1992)
(trial court "carefully considered and weighed all of the [mitigating] evidence about Durocher
that could be gleaned from" the record, despite defendant's adamant refusal to introduce
Vol. 18
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Thus, the supreme court sometimes reverses where a trial court's findings
regarding mitigation are unclear.'
51
At the other end of the spectrum is Duncan v. State,"2 where the
court used the vagueness of the trial court's discussion of mitigation in
striking mitigating circumstances and affirming the death sentence.'53
Granting the State's cross appeal, the court found the evidence did not
support findings of mitigation regarding Mr. Duncan's state of mind at the
time of the murder, and specifically pointed to the lack of clarity in the trial
court's discussion of mitigation regarding the defendant's intoxication.'"
The court stated:
As noted by the trial court in its sentencing order, "[a]ll witnesses
testified that the Defendant appeared sober and that no one observed
him drink any alcoholic beverages since the night before." In light of
this finding of fact, which is supported by the record, it is unclear
whether the trial court actually found that Duncan was under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the murder of whether the trial court
was merely reciting the mitigating circumstance as proposed by the
defendant.'5
3. Use of Incorrect Legal Standards
Claims that sentencing orders have applied incorrect legal standards
have met uneven results. In Scott v. State, 56 the court wrote that the trial
court's use of the lesser standard of clear and convincing evidence for
aggravating circumstances (rather than the correct standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt) "makes the sentencing order in this case fatally defec-
tive."' 57 The court added, "we caution trial judges to carefully apply the
proper standard in rendering their sentencing decisions."'58  The Scott
decision starkly contrasts with Henry v. State,' 59 in which the court stated
that, notwithstanding the trial court's explicit use of a beyond a reasonable
mitigation) (citations omitted).
151. See, e.g., Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1993); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1992).
152. 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993).
153. Id. at 284.
154. Id. at 283.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. 603 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1992).
157. Id. at 1277.
158. Id.
159. 613 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1993).
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doubt standard in evaluating mitigation, it assumed the trial court intended
to use the correct standard which is a preponderance of the evidence. 6'
There also may be some inconsistency between Valentine v. State
16
and Hall v. State.162  In reversing Terance Valentine's conviction and
death sentence, the Valentine court announced without explanation that it
agreed with Valentine's contention that "the sentencing order [was] flawed
by the court's failure to conduct an independent weighing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances . *...,, In affirming Freddie Lee Hall's
death sentence, the Hall court rejected a similar claim by stating:
As noted earlier, Hall's jury recommended that he be sentenced to
death. In agreeing with that recommendation the court wrote: "It is
only in rare circumstances that this court could impose a sentence other
than what is recommended by the jury, although the court obviously has
the right, in appropriate circumstances, to exercise its prerogative of
judicial override." Hall now argues that the "rare circumstances"
language shows that the court used the wrong standard in considering
the jury's recommendation. We disagree. As we have stated previous-
ly: "Notwithstanding the jury recommendation ... the judge is
required to make an independent determination, based on the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors." This judge recognized that the final
decision as to penalty was his and conscientiously weighed and
discussed the aggravating and mitigating evidence and made his decision
based on the evidence. We are convinced that he applied the proper
standard. 164
F. Appellate Review
1. Espinosa Remands
The Espinosa remand cases are a mixed bag. In 1992, after having
found unconstitutional Florida's former standard jury instruction on the
heinousness circumstance, the United States Supreme Court remanded
several cases to the Supreme Court of Florida for reconsideration in light of
that decision.' 65
160. Id. at 432.
161. 616 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1993).
162. 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla 1993).
163. Valentine, 616 So. 2d at 974.
164. Hall, 614 So. 2d at 477 (citations omitted).
165. One Espinosa remand case, Hodges v. Florida, 113 S. Ct. 33 (1992), presented a
challenge to the standard jury instruction on the premeditation circumstance. Mr. Hodges'
Vol. 18
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/4
Caldwell
During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida granted relief
in one remand case,166 while denying relief in six others on grounds of
procedural default and harmless error. 167  Happ v. State161 is typical of
the decisions denying relief. The Happ court found a procedural default
because, although William Frederick Happ's trial lawyer objected to in-
struction on the heinousness circumstance, the objection "was not based on
the assertion that the instruction was unconstitutionally vague but on the
assertion that the instruction was inapplicable under the circumstances of the
case."' 169  Furthermore, the court stated the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt since the murder was so brutal that "regardless of the
instruction given, the jury would have recommended and the trial judge
would have imposed the same sentence."' 70  Likewise, in Hodges v.
State,'7' the court applied a procedural bar and then stated: "[t]here is
ample support in the record for finding the cold, calculated, and premeditat-
ed aggravator. Any error in the instruction, if any existed, therefore, was
harmless and would not have affected the jury's recommendation or the
judge's sentence."' 72
The foregoing harmless error analyses are difficult to square with
Hitchcock v. State.17  Hitchcock represented a paradigmatic case of
heinousness. '7' Although, in the terminology of Hodges, there was
certiorari petition presented only this question for review: "Is the Florida standard jury
instruction on the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance for capital
sentencing proceedings unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments'?"
166. See Hitchcock v. State, 614 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1993).
167. See Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.), revised and superseded on denial of
rehg, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S385 (Fla. June 24 1993); Hodges v. State, 619 So. 2d 272 (Fla.
1993); Happ v. State, 618 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1993); Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 352 (1993); Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679 (Fla.), certdenied, 114
S. Ct. 328 (1993).
168. 618 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1993).
169. Id. at 206.
170. Id.
171. 619 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1993).
172. Id. at 273.
173. 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020
(1992).
174. See the discussion in Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2121 (1992). The
evidence was that Mr. Hitchcock strangled a 12-year-old girl because she was going to report
that he had sex with her. Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh g denied, 113 S. Ct. 21 (1992).
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"ample evidence"'75 to support the circumstance, the court asserted that it
could not find the improper instruction harmless by stating: "[w]e cannot
tell what part the instruction played in the jury's consideration of its recom-
mended sentence.'
176
2. Harmless Error
When constitutional error has occurred in a death penalty proceeding,
reversal is generally required'77 unless the State can demonstrate the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
8
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the
jury actually rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.
79
Thus, the State must show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' 80  "[T]he
question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt
has been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards
appropriate for criminal trials."'' The "appellate court can [not] fulfill
its obligations of meaningful review by simply reciting the formulation for
harmless error."'
' 82
The Florida Supreme Court does not always seem to comply with these
principles in its harmless error analysis. The Hodges analysis, that there
was "ample support" in the record to support the circumstance, is the exact
opposite of what the United States Supreme Court requires.8 3 Happ did
175. Hodges, 619 So. 2d at 273.
176. Hitchcock, 614 So. 2d at 484.
177. Alternatively, the appellate court can cure the error by engaging in independent
fact-finding or reweighing of evidence. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
The Supreme Court of Florida has eschewed this approach. See also Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at
2122-23.
178. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
179. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993) (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 2081 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
181. Yates v. Evart, I11 S. Ct. 1884, 1898 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946)).
182. Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946) (rejecting a similar
argument by the government).
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not purport to determine whether the sentencing decision "actually rested"
on matters independent of the improper instruction."' In Jones v.
State,"'85 the court did not make any analysis in finding harmless a penalty-
phase instruction and stated: "Any error in the jury instructions, including
not telling the jury to merge the pecuniary gain and felony-murder factors
if found, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'86  In Sochor v.
State,"7 which had been remanded by the United States Supreme Court
for the state court's failure to undertake a harmless error analysis, the
Florida Supreme court merely asserted that the erroneous use of an
aggravating circumstance was harmless because there were other aggravating
circumstances and no mitigating circumstances found by the trial court
judge.'88 The court did not say that it concluded, or how it could have
concluded, that the erroneous circumstance, on which the trial court
explicitly relied, did not contribute to the sentencing decision.'89 Contrary
to Sochor is James v. State.9 ° In James the court ruled that use of the
unconstitutional instruction on the heinousness circumstance may have been
harmful even though there were four other valid aggravating circumstances
to weigh against no mitigating circumstances."'
Perhaps the most remarkable analysis of erroneous admissions of police
statements is in Thomas v. State,'92 where the court stated: "[t]he police
statements give a false picture of the crime and could easily mislead or
confuse the jury. On this record, however, we find the error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."'1 93
184. Happ, 618 So. 2d at 206.
185. 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992).
186. Id. at 1375 (citations omitted).
187. 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1993).
188. Id. at 293.
189. Johnson contains this similarly brief discussion: "[s]triking a single aggravator
would not affect these sentences, and the trial court's erroneous finding of pecuniary gain for
the Beasley murder was harmless error. Therefore, we affirm Johnson's sentences of death."
Johnson, 608 So. 2d at 13; see also Stewart v. State, 620 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 1993) ("On
this record, however, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
190. 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993).
191. Id. at 669.
192. 618 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1993).
193. Id. at 157. Although the court did not state whether it considered the error to be
constitutional, it applies the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to all errors. See
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1134 (Fla. 1986).
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3. Procedural Default
The Espinosa remand cases may raise questions about the Florida
Supreme Court's use of procedural defaults as a bar to constitutional claims.
In Hodges, for instance, the court noted on remand from the United States
Supreme Court that in its original opinion it had not considered Mr. Hodges'
attack of the jury instruction procedurally defaulted and stated: "[w]e sum-
marily found the issue meritless [in the original opinion], but we should
have held it procedurally barred because Hodges did not preserve it for
review by objecting at trial. Therefore, we now hold that the sufficiency of
the cold, calculated instruction has not been preserved for review.' 194
Thus, it appears the court did not apply procedural defaults consistently
during the two or so years before Espinosa. Accordingly, federal courts
may be reluctant to find that procedural defaults bar litigation of constitu-
tional claims in Florida capital cases. A state's inconsistent application of
procedural defaults will not bar federal review of federal constitutional
issues. 9 ' Inconsistent application of procedural defaults may also violate
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion.96
4. Proportionality
The Supreme Court of Florida produced several interesting decisions
regarding its proportionality review of death sentences. 9
194. Hodges, 619 So. 2d at 273. The court also applied procedural defaults for the first
time on remand in Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.), revised and superseded on denial
of reh'g, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S385 (Fla. June 24, 1993); Happ v. State, 618 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
1993); Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1993); Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679 (Fla.
1993); see also Occhicone v. Singletary, 618 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1993), wherein the Florida
Supreme Court stated: "We could have, and probably should have, also said [in the 1990
direct appeal decision] that the claim was procedurally barred because of no objection at the
time that the claim was procedurally barred because of no objection at the trial court level.
In any event, the current claims are procedurally barred." Id. at 730.
195. See Ford v. Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 850 (1991); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341
(1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985); Wilcher v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 96 (1993); Smith v. Black, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1992).
196. See Myers v. Ylst, 897 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990)
(inconsistent retroactive application of decisions violates Equal Protection); Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
197. See cases cited in this discussion infra, pp. 28-31.
Vol. 18
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/4
Caldwell
a. Weighing of Circumstances
The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly said in the past that it
does not reweigh circumstances in performing appellate review,198 and has
emphasized that its proportionality review does not involve reweighing.' 99
Yet, the survey period shows the court engaged in weighing circumstances
in the limited context of proportionality review.
In Kramer v. State,"' the court engaged in a type of reweighing.
The court stated:
In Tillnan v. State, we explained that the purpose of the doctrine of
proportionality is to prevent the imposition of "unusual" punishments
contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, among other
reasons. While the existence and number of aggravating or mitigating
factors do not in themselves prohibit or require a finding that death is
nonproportional, we nevertheless are required to weigh the nature and
quality of those factors as compared with other similar reported death
appeals. 0 '
In the court's initial opinion regarding Douglas Cannady's two death
sentences in Cannady v. State,2 °2 the court seemed to engage in weighing
and rejected a proportionality argument. The court stated: "[i]n weighing
the nature of the convictions at issue, we find Cannady's proportionality
argument with regard to Boisvert's murder to be without merit.
2 3
Maulden v. State20 4 presented a different weighing issue. The trial
court wrote that it was the premeditated nature of the murders that called for
imposition of the death penalty. However, finding that the evidence did not
198. E.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319 (1991) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court
has made it clear on several occasions that it does not reweigh the evidence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.").
199. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. 1988).
200. 619 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1993).
201. Id. at 277. In Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 168-69 (Fla. 1991), the court had
asserted that to conduct proportionality review is "to consider the totality of circumstances
in a case, and compare it with other capital cases. It is not a comparison between the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id (emphasis added).
202. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S67 (Fla. Jan. 14), supersededon grant ofreh'g, 620 So. 2d 165
(1993).
203. Id.
204. 617 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993).
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support the premeditation circumstance, the supreme court reduced the
sentence to life imprisonment." 5
b. Single Aggravator Cases
A reasonable postulate of proportionality review is that the death
sentence is to be reserved for the most aggravated and least mitigated
murders.2"6 Thus, the general rule is that the death sentence is inappropri-
ate for murders involving only a single aggravating circumstance unless
there is nothing, or very little, in mitigation.2"7 However, where the single
aggravating circumstance involves a prior murder, the supreme court has
found the death penalty to be a proportional punishment.0 8
In Burns v. State,20 9 the court struck the heinousness circumstance,
left only the avoid arrest circumstance, and reversed for resentencing, but
did not engage in any proportionality analysis even though there was
substantial mitigation in the record.210 Similarly, in Crump v. State,21'
the court vacated for resentencing without engaging in proportionality analy-
sis.2 12 In ordering resentencing in Crump and Burns, the court expressed
uncertainty about the trial court's findings of mitigation. In another one-
aggravator case,"' the court simply disapproved of the trial court's failure
to find mitigation, made its own determination that there was "strong
nonstatutory mitigation," and declared the death sentence disproportionate
to the crime.214 Similarly, in both White v. State215 and DeAngelo v.
205. Id. at 303.
206. See Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1989); State v. Dixon, 283 So.
2d 1, 7-8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom, Hunter v. Florida, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
207. See Songer, 544 So. 2d at 1011.
208. See Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993); Slawson v. State, 619 So. 2d 255
(Fla. 1993).
209. 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992).
210. The substantial mitigation shown in the record was the statutory mitigating
circumstance of no significant criminal history, and the non-statutory mitigation, which the
trial court deemed "not significant," that Mr. Bums was raised in a poor rural environment;
he worked hard to support his family, he supported his children, he received an honorable
discharge from the armed services, and he expressed remorse for the murder. id. at 603.
211. 622 So. 2d 963, 973 (Fla. 1993).
212. Id.
213. Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992). The court struck three aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court, leaving only the pecuniary gain circumstance (Mr.
Clark had committed the murder to obtain the decedent's job). Id. at 514-16.
214. Id. at 516.
215. 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1993).
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State,"6 the supreme court reduced the sentences to life imprisonment in
light of the substantial mitigation found below.
Not to be overlooked is the "no aggravator" case of Cannady v.
State.2"7 Thinking that his wife was depressed as a result of being raped,
although it is not clear that she actually was raped, Michael Cannady fatally
shot her. He then went to the home of the supposed rapist and fatally shot
him. Finding that the heinousness and premeditation circumstances applied
to both murders, the trial court imposed two death sentences. However, the
supreme court struck both aggravating circumstances and did a curious
thing. On the one hand, it decided the murder of the wife constituted a
previous violent felony so that the trial court erred in not applying that
circumstance to the man's murder, but on the other hand, and without
explanation, it did not find the murder of the man was a violent felony that
should apply to the wife's murder. It then reduced the sentence in the
wife's murder to one of life imprisonment because both circumstances found
by the trial court were invalid, and ordered resentencing in the other murder,
for consideration of the prior violent felony circumstance notwithstanding
that both circumstances found by the trial court were invalid. The court
specifically held that the death sentence was not disproportionate for the
man's murder.2"'
The court rethought the matter on rehearing, deciding that since the
State had not urged the prior violent felony circumstance, it had waived its
application. Therefore, it determined there were no longer any aggravating
circumstances applicable to either murder and both sentences were reduced
to life imprisonment.2"9
5. Review of Findings Regarding Circumstances
Although the supreme court will often give great deference to the trial
court's findings of sentencing circumstances, it may at other times engage
in strict scrutiny review.
Robertson v. State22° set a high standard for findings of aggravating
circumstances, reflecting a requirement of positive proof and forbidding
"logical inferences" as their sole support.22' However, the supreme court
216. 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993).
217. 620 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1993).
218. Id. at 169-70. The brief proportionality discussion makes no mention of the
substantial mitigation set out elsewhere in the decision.
219. Id. at 171.
220. 611 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1993).
221. Id.
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in other cases has been willing to uphold circumstances on the basis of
inferences. The court in Clark v. State22 upheld the pecuniary gain
circumstance based on the defendant stating after the killing: "I guess I got
his job now," and his applying for the decedent's job the next morning." 3
In Trepal v. State,224 the court upheld the great risk circumstance based on
the inference that other persons could have drunk from the poisoned Coca-
Cola bottles and died.225
In DeAngelo v. State,226 the court announced that it would recognize
an aggravating circumstance not found by the trial court only where it "is
unquestionably established on the record and not subject to dispute." '227
As previously noted in Cannady, the court initially had found a circum-
stance not found by the trial court, but on rehearing decided the state had
waived this circumstance by not arguing it at the trial level and not filing
a cross appeal.228
6. Relief
The court continues to be inconsistent in its determination of what
relief to give for penalty-phase errors. When striking an aggravating
circumstance, the court may find the error harmless without any extensive
analysis; 229 order new jury sentencing proceedings; 23 ° order resentencing
without a jury;23' or may, on its own, reduce the sentence to one of life
imprisonment.232
222. 609 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1992).
223. Id. at 515.
224. 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993).
225. Id.
226. 616 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1993).
227. Id.
228. Cannady, 620 So. 2d at 171.
229. See Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 293 (Fla. 1993) (reversal not required because
there were other aggravating circumstances and no mitigating).
230. See Padilla v. State, 618 So. 2d 165, 170 (Fla. 1993) (new jury sentencing where
court used circumstance not supported by evidence); James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668, 669
(Fla. 1993) (new jury sentencing even though there were four remaining valid circumstances
and no mitigation); Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092, 1096 (Fla. 1993) (stating that "due
to the peculiar facts of this case, we cannot find the error in instructing the jury on and
finding these inapplicable aggravators to be harmless.").
231. See Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1234 (judge resentencing where trial court used
circumstances not supported by evidence).
232. See Maulden, 617 So. 2d at 303; DeAngelo, 616 So. 2d at 441.
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Craig v. State233 presents a curious situation. Robert Patrick Craig
and Robert Schmidt murdered two men to cover up their cattle stealing
operation. Mr. Schmidt received life sentences for his cooperation; Mr.
Craig received two death sentences, one pursuant to ajury death recommen-
dation, the other contrary to a life recommendation. The supreme court
remanded Mr. Craig's case for resentencing because of the trial judge's
refusal to consider additional mitigating evidence after the jury sentencing
proceedings.234 Because the error occurred after the jury's penalty verdict,
the court ordered resentencing without a jury. On remand, a new judge took
over the case and again imposed death sentences.235 The supreme court
ruled that tinder Corbett v. State,236 the judge could not sentence the
defendant without hearing all of the evidence heard by the jury.237
Accordingly, the supreme court vacated for new jury sentence proceedings
for the death verdict murder. The court also reversed the override sentence
"[b]ecause Craig's original jury recommended life imprisonment for
Eubanks' murder, the new jury will recommend a sentence only for
Farmer's murder. The judge, however, will sentence Craig for both
murders. 238
G. Tedder
Although the court affirmed two override sentences during the survey
period, 239 it strongly re-emphasized the Tedder v. State24 rule which
requires a trial court to follow a life verdict except in the most compelling
cases:
Under Florida law, the role of the jury is one of great importance, and
this is no less true in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Juries are at
the very core of our Anglo-American system of justice, which brings
the citizens themselves into the decision-making process. We choose
233. 620 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1993).
234. Id. at 175.
235. Id. at 175-76.
236. 602 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1992).
237. Craig, 620 So. 2d at 176.
238. Id
239. See Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993); Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d
799 (Fla. 1992); see also Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992), and Stevens v. State,
613 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1992), it reduced the sentences to life imprisonment. Craig (remanded
for resentencing) and Cannady (sentences reduced to life imprisonment) involved double
homicides with one life recommendation and one death recommendation.
240. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
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juries to serve as democratic representatives of the community, ex-
pressing the community's will regarding the penalty to be imposed. A
judge cannot ignore this expression of the public will except under the
Tedder standard adopted in 1975 and consistently reaffirmed since
then.24'
H. Race
In Furman v. Georgia,242 Justice Stewart stated:
My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be
discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination
has not been proved, and I put it to one side.243
In Foster v. State,44 the Supreme Court of Florida mirrored Justice
Stewart's brand of logic. In this case, while moving to preclude the State
from seeking the death penalty, Charles Kenneth Foster unsuccessfully
sought an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that the Bay County State
Attorney's Office pursued prosecution more vigorously and fully in cases
involving white victims than in cases involving black victims:
In support of his claim, Foster proffered a study conducted by his
counsel of some of the murder/homicide cases prosecuted by the Bay
County State Attorney's Office from 1975 to 1987. Analyzing the raw
numbers collected, Foster concluded that defendants whose victims were
white were 4 times more likely to be charged with first-degree murder
than defendants whose victims were black. Of those defendants charged
with first-degree murder, white-victim defendants were 6 times more
likely to go to trial. Of those defendants who went to trial, white-
victim defendants were 26 times more likely to be convicted of first-
degree murder. The court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing,
finding that the alleged facts did not make out a prima facie claim of
discrimination.245
241. Stevens, 613 So. 2d at 403 (citation omitted).
242. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
243. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
244. 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992).
245. Id. at 463.
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Relying on McCleskey v. Kemp,246 the supreme court concluded that
Mr. Foster had "offered nothing to suggest that the state attorney's office
acted with purposeful discrimination in seeking the death penalty in his
case."247  It rejected his claim that McKleskey did not govern because
Foster had only provided statistics regarding the individual office prosecut-
ing his case, rather than the statewide statistics which could have supported
his view. Further, the court criticized Mr. Foster's numbers as raw data and
pointed out that "[t]he figures indicating that of the defendants who went to
trial, white-victim defendants were twenty-six times more likely to be
convicted of first-degree murder than were black-victim defendants cannot
be attributed to a decision by the Bay County State Attorney's Office and
thus are not relevant here." '248
I. Discovery
One unfamiliar with Florida death penalty proceedings may be
astonished to learn that in twenty years of litigation, the supreme court has
never decided whether the discovery rule 249 applies to capital sentencing.
In Elledge v. State,25 the court reversed a death sentence based on the
trial court's failure to conduct a hearing when the defense claimed a
discovery violation in penalty proceedings.25' The court seemed to
operate on the tacit assumption that the State did have a duty to comply
with the discovery rule.
As previously noted, Burns v. State involved the discovery-related issue
of whether the State may have a mental health expert examine the defendant
in preparation for the sentencing hearing. 2 The court left the question
open.
253
246. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (while statewide statistics showed that persons killing whites
were 4.3 times more likely to receive death sentences than persons killing blacks, they did
not support inference that decisionmakers in individual defendant's case acted with purposeful
discrimination).
247. Foster, 614 So. 2d at 463.
248. Id. at 464 n.9.
249. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
250. 613 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1993).
251. Id. at 436.
252. 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992).
253. The practice regarding the Elledge and Burns issues varies widely from circuit to
circuit (and even from courtroom to courtroom) throughout the state. It is anticipated that
the Criminal Rules Committee will submit a proposed rule covering these matters by the end
of 1993.
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III. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Newly discovered evidence
Scott v. Dugger254 considered questions relating to presentation of
newly discovered evidence in post-conviction proceedings. As previously
noted, Abron Scott contended that his co-defendant's life sentence, entered
after his own death sentence was affirmed, constituted "newly discovered
evidence" to be raised in a post-conviction challenge to the death sen-
tence.255 The court agreed, setting out the standards that apply to such
claims:
Two requirements must be met in order to set aside a conviction or
sentence because of newly discovered evidence. First, the asserted facts
"must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel
at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel
could not have known them by the use of diligence." Second, "the
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would
probably produce an acquittal on retrial." The Jones standard is also
applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should
have been imposed. 56
B. Discovery
While a rule of criminal procedure governs motions for post-conviction
relief,57 they are considered civil proceedings governed at least partially
by the rules of civil procedure.5 Nevertheless, neither the civil nor the
criminal discovery rules seem to apply fully to post-conviction.259
However, Florida's Public Records Act26° provides for access to criminal
case records after appeal and operates as a vehicle for post-conviction
discovery. There continues to be substantial litigation regarding post-
conviction discovery via chapter 119.
In Hoffman v. State,26 ' Barry Hoffman requested from the State
Attorney documents possessed by agencies outside the State Attorney's
254. 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992).
255. Id. at 468.
256. Id. (citations omitted).
257. See FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.850.
258. See Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1984).
259. See Davis v. State, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1713 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1993).
260. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-119.16 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
261. 613 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1992).
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jurisdiction. The supreme court held that the defendant must address his
requests directly to agencies "outside the judicial circuit in which the case
was tried and those within the circuit which have no connection with the
state attorney ..... 16 The court added that
[a]t the same time, we encourage state attorneys to assist in helping
defendants obtain relevant public records from such outside agencies so
as to facilitate the speedy disposition of post-conviction claims.
[Furthermore,] all public records in the hands of the prosecuting state
attorney are subject to disclosure by way of motion under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850 even if they include the records of outside
agencies. Likewise, the public records of the local sheriff and any
police department within the circuit that was involved in the investiga-
tion of the case may also be obtained in the manner outlined in
Provenzano v. Dugger.263
In Walton v. Dugger,2 64 the state partially refused Jason Dirk Wal-
ton's chapter 119 request on the ground that some of the matters were
privileged. It also contended on appeal that he had defaulted his chapter
119 request by demanding compliance in his rule 3.850 motion without
initiating a separate civil action under section 119.11. In an interlocutory
order, the supreme court rejected the claim of procedural default, ruling that
a section 119.11 action was unnecessary where the defendant sought relief
under rule 3.850. As to the claim of privilege, it wrote: "[wihen, as in the
instant case, certain statutory exemptions are claimed by the party against
whom the public records request has been filed or when doubt exists as to
whether a particular document must be disclosed, the proper procedure is to
furnish the document to the trial judge for an in camera inspection."26 5
In Parole Commission v. Lockett,266 the court decided that a judge
presiding over a rule 3.850 motion does not have the power to order disclo-
sure of parole commission investigation files prepared for use in clemency
proceedings.
262. Id. at 406.
263. Id. (citing Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1990)).
264. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S309 (Fla. May 27, 1993).
265. Id. at S310.
266. 620 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1993).
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C. Retroactivity
The supreme court ruled that Espinosa v. Florida2 67 applies retroac-
tively in post-conviction proceedings when the defendant argued at trial that
the heinousness instruction was unconstitutional.268 But it refused to apply
the Espinosa Rule retroactively in post-conviction if the trial attorney did
not make the objection.269  It also held that Sochor v. Florida.. and
Stringer v. Black271 were not fundamental changes in the law such as to
apply on post-conviction.272
D. Rule 3.85173
The court held that the "speed-up" provisions of Rule 3.851, Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, are constitutional.274
IV. CONCLUSION
For the most part, decisions during the survey period involved case-
specific issues. The supreme court has yet to decide several issues affecting
virtually all capital cases, including the constitutionality of the standard
instruction on "premeditated murder," the standard instruction defining
"reasonable doubt," and various issues pertaining to penalty-phase discovery.
267. 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
268. See James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668, 669-70 (Fla. 1993).
269. See Occhicone v. Singletary, 618 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 1993); Melendez v. State,
612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 349 (1993).
270. 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992).
271. 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
272. See Mills v. Singletary, 606 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1992).
273. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.851 (providing for expedited treatment of post-conviction
claims when a death warrant is signed).
274. See Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 1993).
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